Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets

Abstract : This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley, 2006, 77 (4), pp.555-577. 〈10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00319.x〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [9 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

http://hal.grenoble-em.com/hal-00569121
Contributeur : Celine Jullien <>
Soumis le : vendredi 25 février 2011 - 10:15:58
Dernière modification le : mardi 30 janvier 2018 - 17:50:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : jeudi 26 mai 2011 - 02:35:17

Fichier

StaropoliJullienAPCE-Mars2006-...
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Carine Staropoli, Celine Jullien. Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley, 2006, 77 (4), pp.555-577. 〈10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00319.x〉. 〈hal-00569121〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

662

Téléchargements de fichiers

632